



Paris Terrorists attacks November 13th, 2015

Who we are
How we prepared
What happened
How we faced it
Lessons learnt



Who we are

The BSPP : an atypical military unit

French fire services :

France :

- 340 000 miles²
- 66 000 000 Inhabitants
- 96 departments in continental France + 5 overseas

250 000 firefighters in France :

- 38 000 professional (15%) (Civilians)
- 200 000 volunteers (80%) (Civilians)
- 12 000 military (5%) in Paris (Army), Marseille (Navy) and FORMISC (National reinforcements- army)




In PARIS :

Double subordination : interiors (mission and budget) / defence (human resource and status) :

- Youth
- Availability
- Discipline
- Doctrine consistency
- Military command and control



BSPP's area of responsibility and territorial organisation



- 500 miles² 800 km²
- 7 Millions inhabitants + 2 M commuters/day
- 45 Millions tourists/year
- 25% of the French GDP

- PARIS
- 123 municipalities / 3 departments
- Biscarosse
- Kourou (French Guyana) / Europe's spaceport

Principles:

- 1 Fire station for 10 km²
- On spot in 10 min
- Mutual support
- 3 operational Groups
- 26 Operational Companies
- 76 Fire stations

Total strength :
8500 Firefighters
including 60 doctors



A UNIT WITH MULTIPLE MISSIONS

Usual risk

- Emergency aid (80%)
- Car accidents (5%)



Critical risk:

- Fire-fighting (3%)
- Gas leaks...



Exceptional Risk: CBRN, USAR, Research dogs, Scuba Divers, High risk intervention teams (Terrorism, Urban unrests, Pandemic, flooding...)




→ Versatility of the French fire units



An extraordinary operational balance

- 2 000 000 calls a year (Phone numbers 18 or 112)
- 450 510 operations in 2015 (almost 1 out of 5 calls)
- Near 1 250 operations per day



→ While under terrorist attacks , still 1250 standard operations / day



Integration of the emergency network

BSPP's Institutional partners

- Police
- SAMU (Health Care service)
- AASC (First aid associations)
- Army (Sentinel Operation)



→ Inter services coordination







Situation before NOV 2015


The threat

Geopolitical context

Terrorism not new in Europe!



Vision of Humanity.org



INSTITUTE FOR ECONOMICS & PEACE



→ A target among others in the French minds



The threat

- « worm in the fruit », terrorists are French citizens

**France MARCH
2012:
7 persons killed**



January 2015 events : Charlie Hebdo caricatures

- Shootings JAN 7th (12 journalists and police officers killed)
- Montrouge 8th (1 policewoman killed)
- Vincennes 9th (4 Jewish customers killed)

Charlie Hebdo newspaper attack:
Popular, political and intellectual mobilization



**Paris JAN. 2015:
17 persons killed**

- A very intellectual and Parisian subject ?
- A clever, harmful and mobile ENI





How BSPP was prepared?

Lessons learnt from Madrid and London attacks (2004/2005)

- 1978 RED Plan
- 2005 RED PLAN ALPHA + RED PLAN Alpha Circulation (Police)
- 2006, PLAN JAUNE (In case of CBRNe operation)
- 2008 SINUS project (Counting/ Identification of the victims)
- 2009 CRISORSEC: Official Website dedicated to the crisis



FICHE MEDICALE DE L'AVANT

ETAT-CIVIL

NOM : _____ PRENOM : _____

SEXE : FEMMIN MASCULIN

AGE ou DATE DE NAISSANCE : _____ 0-24 MOIS 2-14ANS ADULTE

NATIONALITE : _____ PROFESSION : _____

ADRESSE : _____

Rapprochement familial : numéroté(s) SINUS à coller au verso de la FMA

PATHOLOGIE/TRAITEMENT

GCS : PA : / FC : FR : SpO2 : T°C : CO : _____

RADIOLOGIES DOMINANTES : UR (U2-U3) UA (EU-U1)

CRANE THORAX ADMEN BRULE INTOXIQUE BLASTE FRACTURES

POLYTRAUMATISE RACHIS AUTRE Préciser : _____

DIAGNOSTIC et TRAITEMENT : VPP INTUBE GARROT

EVOLUTION : AMELIORATION STABILISATION AGGRAVATION

UR (U2-U3) UA (EU-U1) DCD

TRANSPORT/DESTINATION

TRANSPORT : NON MEDICALE MEDICALE COLLECTIF A transporter allongé

DESTINATION : _____ SERVICE : _____ VECTEUR : _____

FICHE NAVETTE (PRV / PMV/ TRIAGE) -> REGULATION SAMU -> EVACUATION

UR (U2-U3) UA (EU-U1) M. patient PMA

SEXE : F M Age : _____

Synthèse pour régulation : VPP INTUBE GARROT

CRANE THORAX ADMEN BRULE INTOXIQUE BLASTE FRACTURES


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A transporter allongé

TRANSPORT : NON MEDICALE MEDICALE COLLECTIF HORAIRES de DEPART : _____

DESTINATION : _____ SERVICE : _____ VECTEUR : _____

Principles of RED PLAN ALPHA





Back to basic notions of disaster medicine

- Effort on survivable victims
- Triage
- Quick evacuation (kinetic and depth)



Lessons learnt from previous attacks

- **2011 new operational center, co-location of 3 pillars:**
 - Call center
 - BSPP Medical coordination
 - Crisis situation center
- **Field training and command post exercises**
- **Planning on different scenarios (focus on active shooter)**
- **Sharing of responsibilities : Command and control principles :**
 - **DO** – Director of operations (Prefet de police)
 - **COS** – Commander of Rescue operations (BSPP)
 - **DSM** : Director of the Medical Response (BSPP)
 - **COP** – Commander of Police Operations (Police)
 - **COPJ** – Commander of Judicial Operations (Justice)
- **Zoning of the area of operations :**
 - **Exclusion Zone (Only SWAT units)**
 - **Controlled zone (Rescue units)**
 - **Support Zone (Command Post and logistics)**





Friday, November 13th 2015


CONTEXT

- A few local attacks since January 2015 (*Villejuif 18 April, Isère 26 June , Thalys 21 August*)
- Tension “under control” : Sentinel Military Operation, many police forces (COP21)
- Friday 13 evening, day before WE
- Mild weather, many customers in the bars and at the terrace of the restaurants
- France – Germany, football match at the “Stade de France” :
 - 72 000 spectators ;
 - President Hollande and high authorities in the stadium ;
 - Live broadcast on TV.




SPACE-TIME FRAMEWORK

- **Two main locations:**
 - ✓ out of the Stade de France (72,000 people + HoS) ;
 - ✓ shootings in the 10th and 11th arrondissements of Paris
- **7 attacks in 40 minutes (between 21:19 and 22:00).**
- **Fixation point at the BATACLAN concert hall (1,500 spectators)**



Stade de France



Medical Posts :

- 1 – Quick Restaurant
- 2 – Restaurant
- 3 – Hotel Formule 1
- 4 – SDF medical center


● Explosions

PC Command post:

Main effort ?

Deception
maneuver ?


Kinetic and amplitude of the attacks



→ Concentration VS scattering
(ENI COA to disrupt the OPS response)

SPACE-TIME FRAMEWORK

Interventions under guns fire or insecure environment



DURATION OF THE ACTIVE PHASE: 8H



CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

21.19 PM

2.00 AM

OPEN

CLOSED

21.19: Explosion Stade de France

Operation Completed at 1.58

4
Killed

59 EVAC - 3H

21.26: 2nd site BICHAT

Operation completed BICHAT at 11.55 p.m.

13
Killed

22 EVAC - 2H

21.29: 3th site République

Completed at 2:37

5
Killed

19 EVAC - 4H

21.38: 4th site CHARONNE

Operation completed at 0.46

19
Killed

17 EVAC - 3H

21.43: 5th site VOLTAIRE

Operation completed at 1.09

1
Killed

16 EVAC - 3H

21.49: 6th site BATACLAN

Operation completed BATACLAN: 5.30

82
Killed

114 EVAC - 5H

22.00: 7th site
BEAUMARCHAIS

Operation completed
BEAUMARCHAIS at 22.41

0
Killed

7 EVAC - 40 min





Key operational issues

Key points in the initial commitment

- **Insecurity**

→ PBIED, shootings, omnipresent and evolutionary threat

- **Uncertainty**

→ Mumbai scenario in 2008?

- **Scale**

→ 700 call in 40 minutes

- **Resiliency**

→ spontaneous commitment of people



Main issues

Understanding : where, what, who ?

- Enemy maneuver comprehension
- Information chain:
 - To the top (Political authorities)
 - To the team on the ground
 - 5 main sensors (call center, field , medics , liaison officers , medias)

Adequate commitment of means :

- Concentration of forces
VS
- Preservation of Operational Capabilities (For a second wave)
- Standard operational response

Inter services coordination

- Command and control rules (DOS - COS, COP, COPJ)




Main issues

- **Operational Staff activated:**

- Immediate posture at 21.25
- Reinforced Posture at 21.30 (recall of personal staff)

- **Procedure under control: personal well trained thanks to weekly exercises**

- **Decision making process concentrated** at the Operational Center (Priorities)
- **Decentralization of the execution phase** (COS on spot)
- **Subsidiarity** (Full autonomy at Group level)



RECOVERY INITIATIVE PHASE : THE LEVERAGE

Plan and anticipate all you can

- Immediate adaptation of the operational response for standard calls
- Reinforcements asked to the zonal command center (Helos,...)

Adapt to the situation

- Activation from 7 to 21 BSPP's Intensive Care Ambulances within one hour.
- Naming of each spot + 1 COS (Emergency Cdr) and 1 DSM (1 doctor) per site
- Adaptation of the welcome message at the call center (18/112)
- Paris military hospitals for additional medical capabilities

Call for solidarity

- Use of social networks (Twitter: 29000; Facebook: 39000 in 1 hour)
- First aid associations



OPERATING FORCES

BSPP Firefighting units:

- **450** firefighters deployed on sites
- **250** firefighters in support (Ops Center + Logistics)
- **1000** firefighters in stand by (anticipation 2nd wave)
- **21 BSPP Medical teams** deployed on sites
- **125 BSPP Vehicles** deployed

Hospitals :

- **40 medical teams** on sites

Rescue Association : **500** rescue workers deployed

Reinforcements by Civilian Firefighters :

- **260** including 60 deployed for evacuations only

Police forces:

- 3000 police officers

Military Forces:

- 1500 soldiers



TOTAL NUMBER OF VICTIMS :

- **130** Dead
- **481** Injured
- **4000** psychologically impacted

- **17** different nationalities





Lessons learnt

RESILIENCE
DOCTRINE
OPERATIONAL READINESS
EQUIPEMENT

& Next steps

Resilience

BSPP Forces:

- Restore the BSPP potential to 100 % for 08:00 on 14 Nov
- Stay ready... (Building fire in Paris 10 at 05:12 on November 14th)



Medical and Psychological support to the firefighters

- For 100% committed firefighters (850 firefighters examined by a psychiatrist)

Education of the population:

- Since Jan. 2016 : Initiation to the lifesaving skills



Doctrine

Operations:


- **Continue to adapt to the threat**

- Secondary attack
- Disrupt the operational response

- **The « Plan Rouge Alpha » is the suitable response**

- Extraction + **Damage control**
- Triage + stabilization
- Priority to survivability : quick evacuation for extreme urgencies

- **Zoning is adapted**



- **Secure the operational site by police and military forces**



Doctrine

- **Improve the CBRNe reactivity**

- **Uncertainty:** consider all scene as contaminated
- **Modularity,** several sites could be impacted
- Recognition – zoning – **early decontamination**

- **Call up plan**

- Very efficient for calling up the doctors
- Decentralized at Group level



- **Improve the C2 capabilities**

- How to command and control more sites?
- Enhance the Company officers C2 level
- Enhance the Top down information flow (Sms, radio,...)

- **Coordination with police assault teams**

- Casualties extraction team provided by the BSPP




Operational readiness & exercising

- **At Fire units level**

- Identify the potential targets
- Exercises involving local police forces
- CBRN effort : not only for specialists (Immediate decontamination)

- **At BSPP level**

- CPXs involving partners and liaison officers each week
- Combined field exercises involving SAMU, Police and Rescue Associations
- Education: Police officers participating in “COS” course



Operational readiness & procedures

- **COMMON CALL CENTER FOR THE FIRE BRIGADE AND THE POLICE**



Since January 2016, unified call center for the Euro Football championship starting 10 June



Improved Equipment

- **First aid equipment**

- Stretchers



- Damage control kits

- 1 support vehicle per Fire Group

- **Protection**

- Protection Kit for the fire stations

- Night stick, defense gas, bulletproof vest



Damage Control bags with:

- Tourniquets
- Hemostatic dressings
- Rescue blankets...



Improved Equipment

- **VAC – Radio transmissions support vehicle**

- Satellite operational transmissions
- WIFI bubble for data transfers
- Antares (radio system) + 4G multimodal case
- Phones, computers and mobile screen for reporting



- **CCTV – video surveillance network**

- Access to the police cameras at the Operational Center
- Soon extension to the transports network (Metro, Bus,...)



- **Robotics & simulation**

- Exploration





Next steps

Studies and actions to go ahead

Necessity to consider that worst is not surely behind us

- **Worst case scenario: far more casualties**


- Complexity of the evacuation maneuver
- Logistic saturation (hospitals, services...)

- **Taboo attack**

- School – church - Hospitals
- Psychological dimension
- Specific difficulties with the community

- **CBRN**

→ 13 scenarios identified by French authorities





- **PARIS Hackathon**

- Priority to urgent calls (voice – stress – vocabulary)
- How to better manage the Alert by social networks?
- Advice to the population



- **SINUS system extended at French national level**

- BSPP tasked to train all the fire services in France
- Terror attacks could also affect other cities, not always PARIS



- **Share experience with colleagues in Europe and the world**

- Lot of visits and conferences to share experience with colleagues
- In June, meeting in Paris of the Heads of the 28 European Capital cities Fire services





thank you